All Eyes on Türkiye

By Selin Gökkut

This November, the climate world is looking at Türkiye. COP31 is meeting in Antalya, with Murat Kurum presiding and Australia's Chris Bowen leading the negotiations under a shared arrangement agreed at COP30 (UN News, 2026). Billed as the "implementation COP", it is less about new pledges than about turning existing ones into projects, policies and money.

The host has put the circular economy firmly on the table. Zero waste and the circular economy sit among the presidency's nine priority areas (TRT World, 2026), and Kurum told the UN General Assembly that Türkiye would curb emissions through advanced waste management. He was just as blunt about the precondition: without finance, there is no transformation (Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, 2026a).

That is exactly the question our team has spent the autumn on. What actually enables a circular economy in Türkiye, and what does it mean for the banks that will be asked to pay for it?

What 70 studies tell us

We ran a systematic review of circular economy (CE) research on Türkiye: 70 documents in total, 56 peer-reviewed papers and 14 grey-literature reports, coded into 1,034 segments. Every passage was tagged as an enabler or a barrier, then sorted into families such as policy, finance, technology, skills and collaboration.

The picture is consistent across sectors as different as textiles, renewables, municipal waste, water and automotive. Türkiye does not lack strategy: the National CE Action Plan 2022–27, Zero Waste and the 2053 net-zero target give it a clear direction. What the literature keeps flagging is the gap between the vision and the conditions that let a firm or a municipality act on it: enforcement, money, data and partners.

Three findings stand out for anyone heading to Antalya.

1. Money is the bottleneck, and bankability is the key

Finance runs through the whole corpus. The barrier studies that rank causes, from policy barriers in manufacturing to the obstacles facing zero-waste programmes, repeatedly point to a lack of financial and economic support and to the high upfront cost of circular assets. Municipalities face tight budgets; SMEs face tight credit.

But the more recent work moves past "not enough money" to a sharper question: can circular projects be financed on commercial terms? Studies of wastewater treatment plants test bankability directly, using operating savings, recovered-resource revenue and debt-service coverage. Work on municipal finance looks at green bonds and at who captures the wider fiscal benefits. Research on CE entrepreneurship shows that green subsidies help, but that their design matters and dependence on them is a risk.

The new carbon price raises the stakes. Türkiye's first Climate Law came into force in July 2025 (ICAP, 2025), and the regulation for its emissions trading system (TR ETS) followed in August 2026, opening with a pilot phase (Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, 2026b). Once waste and inefficiency carry a price, the business case for circular investment gets easier to make, and easier for a credit committee to underwrite.

2. The EU is the strongest pull

For Turkish firms, the most powerful driver of circularity is often not Ankara but Brussels. The EU is Türkiye's largest trading partner, and its rules travel down export supply chains: the Green Deal and Circular Economy Action Plan, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and a growing set of product, data and disclosure rules.

That last channel grew fastest as our review progressed. In the second round, the number of documents discussing EU product, data and disclosure requirements rose from 12 to 17, covering Türkiye's new sustainability reporting standards (TSRS), the CSRD, packaging and ecodesign rules, and building performance. EU funding and agencies appear in 13 documents.

For banks, this is good news. A client exposed to CBAM or an EU buyer's reporting demands already has a reason to invest, and the same data serves green-loan eligibility under the Turkish Green Taxonomy.

3. SMEs are the missing link

Small and medium-sized firms make up the bulk of Turkish industry, and the literature is clear that they lag on circular readiness: thin resources, limited skills and little access to data or tailored support. They are also the suppliers through which EU requirements eventually arrive.

The obvious bridge is the large buyer: an exporter that helps its suppliers measure, redesign and finance change. Yet this is the thinnest strand in our whole review. Only 7 of 70 documents, and 9 of 1,034 segments, discuss large firms actively supporting SMEs. We are reporting it as a genuine gap in the evidence, and it is one that supply-chain finance could help close.

What to watch in Antalya

If COP31 is to be the implementation COP for circularity, the evidence points to a short list of tests:

  • Finance that fits the asset. Blended structures that pair public grants or development-bank money with commercial loans, sized for recycling plants, water reuse and municipal waste systems.

  • A clear price signal. Progress on the TR ETS pilot and its links to CBAM, so that circular savings show up on the balance sheet.

  • Enforcement and data. Standards for recycled and refurbished goods, and monitoring that lenders can rely on for impact and credit assessment.

  • Supply-chain levers. Programmes that let large exporters bring their SME suppliers along, backed by supply-chain and sustainability-linked lending.

Türkiye arrives in Antalya with the strategy already written. The question for Antalya, and for the banks financing what follows, is whether the conditions to deliver it are put in place.

About the research. This post draws on a systematic literature review of enablers and barriers of the circular economy in Türkiye, carried out by ACE. The full dataset, including the search, screening decisions and coded corpus, is available upon request.

References

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